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ABSTRACT. Nagasawa has argued that the suffering associated with evolution presents a 
greater challenge to atheism than to theism because that evil is incompatible with 
‘existential optimism’ about the world—with seeing the world as an overall good place, and 
being thankful that we exist. I argue that even if atheism was incompatible with existential 
optimism in this way, this presents no threat to atheism. Moreover, it’s unclear how the 
suffering associated with evolution could on its own undermine existential optimism. Links 
between Nagasawa argument and the current debate about the axiology of (a)theism are 
also explored. 
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Many atheists hold that the massive amount of suffering and early death associated with 
evolution—suffering and death that is undeserved, nor due to anyone’s free choice—is a 
powerful reason to doubt that God exists. Yujin Nagasawa has recently proposed, however, 
that the existence of such natural evil is actually a greater threat to atheism.1 If successful, 
Nagasawa’s argument would blow apart a central strand of the case for atheism. In the first 
part of this paper, I’ll offer an interpretation of Nagasawa’s new ‘existential problem of 
evolutionary evil’. Nagasawa argues that past evolutionary suffering presents a challenge to 
what he calls ‘existential optimism’—the view that the world is overall good, and that we 
should be thankful for our existence—and that because this challenge is greater for atheists, 
this should motivate them to endorse theism. I will argue first that even if atheism turned out 
to be incompatible with existential optimism in this way, this presents no threat to atheism as 
such. It would still be important, however, if atheism would force us to give up existential 
optimism—if, coupled with familiar facts about evolutionary history, atheism—or more 
precisely, metaphysical naturalism—entails a dark view of the universe we inhabit.2 But I 
will argue that the suffering associated with evolution cannot on its own show that the world 
isn’t overall good, under a natural interpretation of that axiological claim. In fact, we shall 
see that, if God doesn’t exist, we are simply not in an epistemic position to endorse such 
claims. It is nevertheless possible that the naturalistic universe, or even just life here on little 
Earth, would end up being overall bad. That would be a bleak result. But I will argue that, 
unlike more familiar forms of philosophical pessimism, such global pessimism won’t 
dramatically change our lives, or rule out feeling gratitude for our existence. I will argue 
moreover, that although it is plausible that, if theism is true, the world would be overall good 
(and even exceedingly so), this is not a conceptual truth; it is a substantive axiological claim 
that requires defence. I will conclude by discussing the relation between arguments from 
atheism to pessimism and the comparative questions that have so far been the focus of the 
axiology of (a)theism.  
 
 Nagasawa’s existential problem of evolutionary evil 
 Richard Dawkins once remarked that 
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“We have cause to give thanks for our highly improbable existence, and the law-like 
evolutionary processes that gave rise to it.”3 
 
 Elsewhere, Dawkins offered a gloomier view of evolution, saying that 
 
“[N]atural selection is out there and it is a very unpleasant process. Nature is red in tooth and 
claw. But I don’t want to live in that kind of a world…”4  
 
 Nagasawa suggests that Dawkins’s two remarks illustrate two inconsistent commitments 
held by many atheists.  
 One of these commitments is expressed in Dawkins’s remark about the unpleasantness of 
natural selection. That’s an understatement since the process of natural selection involved the 
suffering and death of trillions of sentient beings, over many hundreds of millions of years. 
That is already a massive amount of evil, or, better, badness, but Nagasawa suggests that 
evolution is associated with an evil that is over and above that first-order badness. Nagasawa 
calls this ‘systemic evil’. We shall explore this idea later.  
 For now, though, let us state this commitment as 
 
Evolutionary Evil (EE). Terrestrial evolutionary history contains a vast amount of badness (and 
evolution may also be a systemic evil). 
 
 The second commitment is supposed to be expressed by the Dawkins’s first remark. 
Nagasawa calls it Existential Optimism (EO), the thesis that 
 
“The world is, overall, a good place and we should be grateful for our existence in it.”5 
 
Nagasawa argues that these two commitments are incompatible. He writes: 
 
“If the “law-like evolutionary processes” guarantee pain and suffering for uncountably many 
humans and other sentient animals, it seems impossible for atheists like Dawkins to consistently 
defend existential optimism.”6 
 
 By contrast, while theists may have difficulty explaining why EE is true, Nagasawa 
argues that they have less difficulty reconciling EE and EO within the theist framework. 
which is not confined to the natural world, offers greater space for further, supernatural value 
to overturn whatever deficit EE may generate.7  
 Nagasawa therefore concludes that: 
 
“We normally take for granted that the problem of evil provides a reason to give up theism… 
Yet… it might be the other way around. The problem of evil, or at least the existential problem 
of systemic evil, provides a reason to give up atheism and a motivation to adopt theism.”8 
 
 Before we assess this argument, we should first ask whether atheists really do have these 
commitments. Few if any reflective atheists would deny that evolution is associated with 
massive natural evil: after all, many of them make extensive appeal to that evil in arguing for 
their atheism. The commitment to Existential Optimism, however, is trickier. This view 
combines an axiological claim: 
 
 Axiological Optimism. The world is, overall, a good place. 
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and a claim about fitting attitudes: 
 
 Attitudinal Optimism. We should be grateful for our existence in the world. 
 
 I will focus first on Axiological Optimism. It is natural to interpret it as the claim that the 
world overall contains more good than bad9—that is after all exactly what pessimists such as 
Schopenhauer deny.10 It is not clear whether by ‘world’ Nagasawa means that entire cosmos, 
across space and time, or just what is going on here on Earth. I will consider both readings 
here.   
 Now Nagasawa rightly rejects the idea that all atheists are “negative, nihilistic, 
pessimistic people who think that life is miserable or absurd” who think that “there is nothing 
about our mortal existence for which we should feel happy or grateful.”11 That’s obviously 
true. But that’s still a far cry from literal endorsement of Axiological Optimism. In fact, 
neither Dawkins, nor the other atheists Nagasawa quotes,12 says anything that directly 
expresses commitment to Axiological Optimism. They merely express gratitude for existing. 
Nagasawa thinks, however, that people like Dawkins wouldn’t express gratitude for existing 
if they thought that there were surrounded by utter misery. He writes,  
 
“Otherwise, their view would be a form of pessimism except about themselves; existential 
optimism is a worldview, rather than the plain assertion that ‘I am happy and grateful to be alive 
(but I do not know about others)’.”13 
 
 But as we’ll see later, attitudes such as gratitude needn’t directly mirror our value 
judgments about the world and we therefore cannot simply infer the latter from the former. 
Moreover, we can believe that things are good in ways that go beyond our personal lives 
without thinking that the world is good, let alone without thinking that about the entire 
cosmos. It’s likely that Dawkins believes that the lives of very many other people are good, 
or good enough. It is a massive step from that to the conclusion that, say, things on Earth, or 
even just terrestrial history till now, is overall good. In fact, I would be surprised if Dawkins, 
or most people, have interesting views on such grand axiological questions. Agnosticism on 
such questions is not a form of pessimism. And, as we shall see below, such agnosticism is 
also appropriate.14 It seems to me doubtful that we can attribute to people a strong 
commitment to a view they never explicitly endorse and which can be supported by little to 
no evidence. 
 
An argument against atheism? 
Setting this aside, we can ask next whether Nagasawa’s problem really offers reason to 
give up atheism. Interpreted as an explicit argument, the key idea seems to be the following: 
 
THE EXISTENTIAL PROBLEM OF EVOLUTIONARY EVIL 
(A)  Evolutionary Evil (EE): terrestrial evolutionary history contains a vast amount of badness. 
(B)  The Bleak Upshot: If atheism is true then, because of EE, Existential Optimism (EO) is 
(probably) false. 
(C) It is easier to reconcile theism with EO.   
 Therefore, 
(D)  Atheists who accept EO have reason to give up atheism and adopt theism. 
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 Let us first consider the final step of Nagasawa’s argument.15 Let us assume for now that, 
if we assume that atheism is true, then EE and EO are indeed somehow incompatible. Would 
this give us “a reason to give up atheism and a motivation to adopt theism”? 
 Notice first that, as the above makes clear, this isn’t a general argument against atheism. 
It is an argument against atheists who also endorse EO, an independent view. It’s obvious 
that atheism entails nothing about gratitude. But, on its own, atheism also entails nothing 
about the overall goodness of the world. Atheism just asserts that a certain supernatural being 
does not exist. Since that being is supposed to be supremely good, atheism entails that this 
good is missing from the world. So atheism does have a certain ‘negative’ axiological 
commitment. But that leaves the question of the overall value of a godless world entirely 
open.16 
 Let us set aside the earlier worry that we have little evidence that many (or any) atheists 
endorse EO. It still seems odd to think that atheists who also accept EO must conclude that 
atheism is false if they accept the Bleak Upshot. If atheists discover that EE is in tension with 
EO, how could that be, on its own, a reason to conclude that the argument from evil, and their 
other arguments against theism, are mistaken? That would be like concluding, from a failed 
exam, not that you’re not as good as you thought but that the teacher must be conspiring 
against you. In most cases, when we encounter strong evidence that things are worse than we 
had assumed, that’s a bad reason to reject that evidence and hold on to our rosy assumption. 
To be motivated to adopt theism on these grounds would be an instance of wishful thinking—
an epistemic vice. Moreover, it is a vice that atheists often accuse theists of succumbing to. 
So surely what atheists should conclude instead is that EO is false.17 
 We might be able to revive the argument by showing that there are independent grounds 
for holding on to EO. As an analogue, consider the moral argument for theism. One version 
of the moral argument goes roughly like this: atheism, it is argued, entails that there is no 
morality, but since we know with far greater certainty that e.g., torturing infants for fun is 
wrong than we know that any of the arguments for atheism are successful, we should reject 
atheism. Now there are many problems with this argument. But it has one major advantage 
over Nagasawa’s argument. It is plausible that we can have a priori knowledge of basic moral 
propositions. But it’s very hard to see how, on atheism, we could have a priori knowledge of 
the overall value of the world. The value of the world is a function of what is in it. And what 
is in our world is a contingent matter—and, as we shall soon see, we are not in a position to 
know many of the relevant facts.18 
 
As an axiological argument 
 I argued that even if the Bleak Upshot were true, this would give us no reason to think 
that atheism is false. I now turn to consider whether we should accept the Bleak Upshot. 
Moreover, even if we reject the argument’s last step, the truth of the Bleak Upshot would still 
be important. It can potentially bear on questions relating to what has been called the 
axiology of theism:19 just as we may want to know whether or not God does exist, we may 
also wish to know whether, if atheism is true, things would be considerably worse in certain 
respects, or even overall bad. We may also wish to know what attitudes we should have 
towards the world, if we find that there is no God. Even if it would be an epistemic vice to be 
motivated to adopt theism just because atheism has bleak implications, it might be perfectly 
appropriate to ardently wish that God exists (or had existed).  
 Let us turn then to what I take to be Nagasawa’s argument for the Bleak Upshot:  
 
 THE AXIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM EVOLUTIONARY EVIL 
(1)  EE: Terrestrial evolutionary history contains a vast amount of badness. 
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(2)  If atheism is true, nothing exists beyond the material universe. 
Therefore 
(3)  If atheism is true, Axiological Optimism is (probably) false: the universe isn’t overall good. 
Therefore 
(4)  If atheism is true, Attitudinal Optimism is (probably) false: we shouldn’t be thankful that 
we, and the world, exist.  
  
 Before considering this argument, it’s worth noting that, if successful, this argument is 
likely to establish something stronger. According to the Bleak Upshot, atheism is likely to 
mean that the world isn’t overall good, or merits our gratitude. This is compatible with the 
world having overall neutral value, being neither good nor bad. But it is unlikely that all the 
good and bad in it exactly cancel each other out. So it is almost certain that the argument 
should really support  
 
(3’)  If atheism is true, then Axiological Pessimism is (probably) also true: The universe is overall 
bad. 
  
 And if (3) supports (4), then (3’) should arguably support 
 
(4’)  If atheism is true, then Attitudinal Pessimism is (probably) also true: we should regret that 
we, and the world, exist.  
 
 I’ll start by asking whether (1) and (2) can support such axiological conclusions. I’ll later 
consider whether, if it did, the further attitudinal claims would follow. 
 Notice first that this argument purports to establish a categorical claim about the value of 
the world under atheism. Thus, when we consider the work (2) is doing in the argument, we 
need to bracket comparative claims to the effect that, e.g., it would be better if theism is true, 
or categorical claims about the value of the world under theism; atheism could entail that the 
world is not good even if theism was somehow also incompatible with Axiological Optimism 
and even if things would have been even worse under theism. I will therefore postpone 
discussion of these further axiological claims. 
 Now strictly speaking (2) isn’t quite right. Atheism does not entail metaphysical 
naturalism and, conversely, theism is of course more than supernaturalism. But Nagasawa is 
obviously right that contemporary atheists are typically naturalists. Still, this means that the 
above argument cannot show that atheism has bleak implications, only that naturalist atheism 
does. Moreover, this way of marking the axiological upshots of atheism does not engage with 
what is axiologically distinctive of the theist alternative—both positively and negatively. 
We’ll return to this when we discuss the categorical axiological properties of theism.  
 More directly relevant for our current purposes is that (2) is merely a negative claim. It 
tells us nothing about the value that the world would contain if atheism is true. It just tells us 
that the only entities and properties which determine that value are those contained in the 
natural world. No supernatural cavalry can come to the rescue to redeem all those millions of 
years of agony. Still, in itself, that’s neither bad nor good news—it may exclude God and His 
immense value, but also Satan and all kind of malignant supernatural forces. 
 So all the positive work must be done by (1). But while (1) is clearly true, and refers to a 
staggering amount of badness, there is plainly a vast gap between (1) and (3), since (1) refers 
only to the badness contained in what is a spatiotemporal part of the world (whether the latter 
is understood to refer to the cosmos as a whole or just to Earth). Moreover, (1) does not yet 
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establish the overall value of that spatiotemporal region since it leaves it open that all that 
badness is counterbalanced or even outweighed by the good contained in this region. 
However, before we can consider these gaps in the argument, we need to get clearer about the 
nature of the natural evil to which (1) refers. In particular, we need to examine Nagasawa’s 
claim that evolution involves a distinctive kind of ‘systemic evil’. 
 
Systemic vs first-order evil 
Nagasawa argues that the ‘cruelty of nature’ raises a problem of evil that is 
‘fundamentally different’ from more familiar formulations that focus on specific events, such 
as the Holocaust, or specific types of events (e.g. earthquakes or murder). By contrast, here 
we are considering an entire biological system that is ‘fundamentally evil’ because it  
 
“… involves competition for survival. For approximately four billion years, uncountably many 
organisms have competed and struggled for survival. In this cruel, blind system, the weaker are 
eliminated, and even the survivors will eventually die, often painfully and miserably.”20  
 
 And because this problem of systemic evil is focused on something more fundamental 
than specific events or types of events, it’s more forceful than the standard problem. 
 The intended axiological import of these claims is unclear. Axiological Optimism makes 
a claim about the overall value of the world. It’s not specific events or types of events that 
decide that value, but their aggregate. So what matters for that is not a particular event of a 
sentient animal being devoured alive, or predation more generally, but the aggregate sum of 
the suffering that was endured over this immense period. 
 At least that is how such axiological questions would be typically addressed, and that is 
how I will understand evolutionary evil. But Nagasawa seems to have something else in 
mind. He may think that, because natural selection is the source of all that suffering, it’s more 
fundamental. Of course, natural selection is causally more fundamental than its products. But 
that just makes it a prodigious instrumental bad. However, that’s irrelevant: merely 
instrumental value adds nothing to the overall value of the world. (Cancer is similarly the 
causal source of an immense amount of suffering but only the suffering it produces matters 
intrinsically: the world would have been just as bad had that suffering been caused by 
something else.) 
 Now, on some views, acts of cruelty and injustice add to the badness of the world over 
and above their consequences. But although Nagasawa describes nature as cruel and unjust, 
these are surely merely metaphors, if atheism is true. Or perhaps the world is made worse by 
being causally wired up such that pain is its guaranteed product? I am open to this idea, 
though it involves a controversial value claim. But even if correct, it seems very doubtful that 
this badness is more significant than the first-order suffering itself. Otherwise it would be 
better if a world contained even more suffering if, say, that suffering was accidental and 
didn’t have its source in such a biological system. This seems wrong.21 
 So the idea of systemic evil requires further clarification. In what follows I will therefore 
focus on the aggregate of evolutionary suffering. But this seems to me to make the argument 
stronger, not weaker. And Nagasawa himself in fact repeatedly appeals to that first-order 
suffering.22 
 
Evolutionary evil and the goodness of the world 
 The amount of suffering that is associated with natural selection, operating over 
hundreds of millions of years, is staggering. We can only respond to it with horror, even 
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though our minds are too feeble to fully grasp suffering on such a scale. But all that natural 
evil, I said, doesn’t even establish that  
 
Evolutionary Pessimism: the overall value of terrestrial evolutionary history (excluding Homo 
sapiens) is negative (or not positive). 
 
 That would depend on whether that evil is outweighed by competing goods: there is 
pleasure and other positive affective states that most animals also experience, and perhaps 
also the value of the existence of sentient beings—as well as, on some views, of all living 
things in their immense variety. 
 Whether evolutionary history contains more bad than good is a difficult empirical 
question. However, several authors argue that the lives of most animals in the wild contain 
more bad than good.23 If this argument about suffering in the wild is correct then it could be 
generalised into a general claim about evolutionary history.24 
 But even that is just a claim about one part of the past. Once humans arrive on the scene, 
they potentially bring into play distinctive goods—such as the value of rational agency, moral 
virtue, deep personal relationship, knowledge, achievement and aesthetic creation and 
appreciation—that are widely held to possess far greater value than mere sentience.25 So to 
show even just that terrestrial history is overall bad until now, Nagasawa will need to show 
either that human history is itself overall bad, or that even if it is good, it’s not enough to 
outweigh the prior bad.26 
 In passages that try to address something like this worry, Nagasawa tells us to suppose 
that 
 
“positive things in the world and life are painted yellow, while negative things in the world and 
life are painted grey. Existential optimism says that although there might be parts of the world 
and people’s lives that are painted mostly grey, overall the whole picture is painted mostly 
yellow”27 
  
 However, Nagasawa holds that natural selection reveals that “this perception of life and 
the world is inaccurate”, and  
“If a large part of the material universe and a large part of life in it are painted grey, atheists have 
to give up existential optimism, which entails that these components are painted mostly 
yellow.”28 
 This passage can suggest that Nagasawa is assuming a spatiotemporal understanding of 
‘overall value’ (at least within the natural world)29: we ask, of a given spatiotemporal part of 
the world, whether it’s overall negative or positive, and then see whether the world is on the 
whole more positive or negative. And, indeed, since evolution has unfolded over billions of 
years, while human history is comparatively incredibly brief, then, if Evolutionary Pessimism 
is correct, then you can see why it might seem that the overall balance is negative. 
 But that would be a mistaken conclusion. To begin with, since most of the universe is 
basically empty, the universe itself is nearly entirely devoid of value (neither grey or yellow). 
So by this logic we should conclude that the world is neither good nor bad. More importantly, 
questions about overall value are not concerned with whether things are positive/negative per 
square mile. A world in which billions feel utter bliss in one spot, and a handful feel mild 
agony in the rest of the world, would count as an overall bad place by this odd measure. 
Questions about overall value are concerned with the aggregate of value out there, not about 
its spatiotemporal spread. 
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 Now while temporal and spatial spread are in themselves irrelevant, numbers do make a 
difference, and the number of sentient beings who had suffered greatly over many millions of 
years is mind-boggling. If Evolutionary Pessimism is true, and we’re hedonists, that badness 
is likely to swamp whatever opposing good human history may contribute. But if we reject 
hedonism, and accept at least some of the non-hedonic goods I mentioned above, then 
answering the question of the overall value of terrestrial history so far would involve an 
enormous undertaking that is obviously beyond the scope of this paper.30 
 In any event, even if we arrive at a grim answer to that question, this will not begin to 
settle the question of the overall value of the world as a whole. For there is, to begin with, our 
own future. Humanity might go extinct soon or go on for many millions of years. The future 
may be utopian or dystopian or anything in between. We simply don’t know. And if we have 
in mind the universe as a whole, the Earth is anyway an incredibly tiny part of that. Now, if 
we are alone in the universe then and sentient beings are the only source of value, then this 
doesn’t matter: whatever conclusions we reach about the Earth also apply to the universe as a 
whole.31 But these are large assumptions. For all we know, there may be a multitude of 
advanced intergalactic civilizations, meaning that what happens on little planet Earth is of 
negligible significance in deciding the value of the universe as a whole. Nagasawa could 
reply that all sentient and rational beings in a naturalist framework must be products of 
natural selection and, therefore, if there’s life elsewhere that just massively adds to the 
overall amount of evil. But this assumes that evolution cannot take more benign forms in 
profoundly different contexts. And even if evolution does operate in similar ways 
everywhere, it is less likely that all rational beings produced by evolution must be similar to 
us. So whatever conclusions we reach about the case of the Earth cannot be assumed to 
generalise. Since we are clueless about the answer to all these questions about the future, and 
life outside the Earth, we simply aren’t in a position to even guess whether Axiological 
Optimism is true, on atheism, at either the terrestrial or cosmic level.32 
 
Atheism, pessimism, and gratitude 
 It remains true that, if Evolutionary Pessimism is correct, then there is a massive 
axiological deficit that needs to be overturned to avoid global pessimism. While we are not 
remotely in a position to know that, it is perfectly possible that things will overall turn out 
bad. Now that would be a depressing fact about the universe. But it is not obvious that this 
should drive us to despair. Now more familiar pessimist views, such as Schopenhauer’s or 
Benatar’s, also make such a claim about the world as a whole.33 But they arrive at that 
general claim via the claim that human lives are overall bad, perhaps even inescapably so. 
The kind of pessimism we are considering is different: that even though our own lives are 
going reasonably well, this good is just a part of a whole that is overall bad.34 
 As I pointed out earlier, people rarely orient their lives in relation to such grand 
axiological questions. Nor would accepting global pessimism force us to change how we live. 
It is hard to see, for example, why it would undermine morality, or make our personal 
projects pointless. And our acts could still make the world as a whole better, perhaps even 
make a great difference; though it would sadly also be true that even if we all did our best, at 
most we could make the world less awful.35 
 Global pessimism may dampen our motivation but it need not change what we do. 
Should it, however, change how we feel? Nagasawa’s argument assumes that, if Axiological 
Optimism is false, we should not feel thankful that we, and the world, exist. But the relation 
between axiology and attitudes such as gratitude is more complex than that. 
 We should first consider the falsity of axiological optimism. If optimism is false, the 
world isn’t overall good. But if the world has neutral value, then it is not bad either. We can 
say, of such a world, that it’s neither better, nor worse, than nothing. By contrast, if global 
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pessimism is true then the world is worse than nothing. It would have been better if the world 
did not exist, or at least if sentient life never emerged within it. That’s a bleak view. 
 Still, how this should affect our attitudes depends on which perspective we adopt. When 
we consider things from the point of view of the universe, as Sidgwick famously put it, then 
we should respond with indifference to a universe with neutral value, and with sadness to one 
with negative value. Attitudes such as gratitude or regret, however, essentially involve a 
comparison with some alternative, so how we should feel about the world, even from such a 
lofty standpoint, depends on what is the relevant alternative. However, that alternative needs 
to be broadly realistic: it makes no sense to feel deep gratitude that, say, I was not kidnapped 
by malevolent extra-terrestrials.36 I argued earlier that even if the world is overall bad, this 
does not give us a reason to reject atheism. But if theism isn’t a realistic alternative from an 
atheist standpoint, then neither can it motivate regretting that God does not exist (though it 
may motivate preferring His existence). 
 The naturalist framework does offer more realistic alternatives. For example, if the very 
emergence of sentient life is extremely unlikely, then a lifeless universe would be such an 
alternative. So if global pessimism is true, we should regret, from such a cosmic standpoint, 
that sentient life ever emerged (though if the world has merely neutral value this contrast 
does not really matter). 
 We rarely, however, see things from such a high altitude. When we are glad about our 
own lives, or the lives of those we care about, we do so from our own personal standpoint. 
Still, we want such partial attitudes to be morally defensible. Now, if our own lives are good, 
and the falsity of Axiological Optimism just means the world has neutral value, then I see no 
problem in being unreservedly glad that we exist. If the alternative is nothing of value, why 
not prefer the current world, which has the same overall value, but also contains us?  
 It is less obvious how we should feel if our own lives are good yet the world around us is 
awful. If, for example, life will inevitably emerge somewhere in our universe, with 
evolutionary evil in its wake, then there is no realistic impartially better alternative, and we 
can again be defensibly glad that, out of this range of awful options, at least the one that 
contains us was realised. And we can be even more clearly glad that we exist if the closest 
alternatives were ones with evolutionary evil but where no intelligent species evolves. If, 
however, life is a rare and contingent thing, and an utterly lifeless universe was in the offing, 
then it is harder to hold, as our all-in attitude, a preference for this awfulness just because, 
within it, we are nevertheless having a good time. But even this does not mean we cannot be 
glad we exist. It just means our gladness shouldn’t be all-in.37 It needs to be conditional: 
given that things have gone so badly, we are still personally pleased that, against the odds, we 
somehow still arrived and are doing reasonably well. While such gladness is conditional, it 
can still be deep and heartfelt. Indeed, most instances of gladness implicitly have that 
structure. And dark surroundings often amplify, rather than dampen, the gladness we feel 
about glimmers of good. 
 So lack of overall good, and even overall badness, are perfectly compatible with justified 
gladness about what’s still good. But it is worth noting that overall value and attitude can also 
come apart in the other direction. For something to be overall good is a low bar. There are 
few people whose lives are so bad that they aren’t even worth living. Yet that hardly means 
that virtually everyone should be glad about their lives. Most of us will insist that a life that 
has just a little bit more good than bad just is not good enough. That can also be true of the 
world as a whole: if good just barely edges out the bad, that’s hardly cause for celebration. It 
may still make for a very disappointing world.38 
 Let me end this section by briefly considering a strand of Nagasawa’s discussion that I 
have deliberately avoided so far. Nagasawa draws parallels between his ‘existential problem 
of evil’ and Janna Thompson’s ‘apology paradox’.39 Suppose a country apologises for, say, 
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injustices committed in its colonialist past. To sincerely apologise for such injustices is 
presumably also to regret them, to wish they never happened. Yet if history had been better in 
this way, neither we, nor the descendants of the victims of such injustices, would have come 
to exist. So such apologies seem to conflict with our gladness that we, and those we care 
about, exist. 
 Nagasawa is correct to see a parallel between the dependence of our individual existence 
on past injustice and the dependence of our existence, and of that of humanity as a whole, on 
the occurrence of evolutionary evil. So there is a similar tension between regretting 
evolutionary evil and being glad that we exist.  
 However, when Nagasawa writes that the thrust of his argument is the question 
 
“Why should we think that the world is overall good and that we should be happy and grateful to 
be alive in it if our existence depends fundamentally on a violent, cruel, and unfair biological 
system which guarantees pain and suffering for uncountably many sentient animals?”,40 
 
 he is, I believe, conflating two distinct issues. While the existence of great past evil 
obviously bears on the question of whether the world is overall good, our dependence on past 
evil does not. To see this, consider on the one hand that the world might be an overall bad 
place even if our existence in no way depended on any past suffering or injustice (imagine, 
for example, that we humans are the product of an intervention by extra-terrestrials). On the 
other, our existence would depend on all that past suffering even if the world as a whole is a 
wonderful place. Indeed, this dependence could be troubling even if the value we humans 
bring about massively outweighs the badness in the evolutionary past. So although both kinds 
of considerations seem to challenge our gladness that we exist, they are distinct. Since I have 
touched on the issue of our dependence on past sentient suffering elsewhere,41 I will set this 
aside here. 
 
Categorical value and the axiology of theism 
 In recent years, there has been increasing interest in axiological questions about theism. 
That discussion asks, not whether God exists, but whether it would be better if God exists, 
with pro-theists holding that it would be, and anti-theists arguing that God’s existence would 
rather makes things worse.42 The axiological claims we have been considering, however, 
involve value claims that are importantly different from the ones the debate in the axiology of 
theism has so far focused on. Whereas that debate has focused on comparative value—on 
relations such as better, worse, or equal—here we have been discussing categorical value—
good, bad or neutral.  
 This difference is significant in several ways. First, the axiology of theism has typically 
assumed a fairly mild view of atheism. Even pro-theists assume, at least implicitly, that 
things can be fairly good if God doesn’t exist. They just argue that they will be far better if 
He does. But Nagasawa’s argument for what I called the Bleak Upshot makes a more 
ambitious claim: that things might be positively bleak if God doesn’t exist, not merely 
inferior. Many people will shrug at the obvious point that things are not perfect; we can still 
be, and perhaps should be, perfectly satisfied if the actual world is good enough. This will not 
be so if the world is positively bad. Second, one worry about the project of the axiology of 
theism is that God is supposed to be a necessary being. Some worry that this means that, if 
God exists, to compare it with the atheist alternative is to compare it with an impossibility.43 
Conversely, if the very idea of God is incoherent, as some atheists argue, then there again 
seems to be no viable alternative to atheism. By contrast, the kind of categorical argument we 
have been considering would go through whether or not there is a viable theist alternative. 
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 We can still ask, however, how such a categorical argument, if successful, would link 
with the more widely discussed comparative questions. Suppose that, if atheism is true, the 
world as a whole is overall bad. If the theist alternative is good—even minimally good—this 
would entail what is known as wide impersonal pro-theism, the claim that the world as a 
whole would be overall better if God exists. And of course it would give us powerful 
impersonal reasons to want God to exist (or to have existed).44 
 Still, that would follow only if we can show that, had God existed, the world would be 
overall good. So I now turn to the question of the categorical value implications of the truth 
of theism.  
 
The categorical value implications of theism 
 Nagasawa’s core argument claims that if God doesn’t exist, then the world (probably) is 
not overall good. As we just saw, this is silent on whether  
 
 Theist Optimism. If God exists, then the world is overall good. 
 
 But Nagasawa suggests that, although the evil associated with evolution should also 
trouble theists, they are in a much better position to hold on to Existential Optimism. He 
highlights, as we saw earlier, that theism offers a transcendent realm, and wider ontology, 
that could provide the materials to overturn whatever badness reigns in the natural world. 
But, to repeat, this is compatible with that transcendent realm making things even worse. 
Nagasawa does also mention more distinctive aspects of theism—the afterlife, and of course 
the existence of a perfectly good, omniscient and omnipotent being, though he doesn’t spell 
out their axiological import. But it’s plausible that if God is the perfect being, God adds 
superlative, likely infinite value to the world. And an eternal, blissful afterlife also seems to 
contribute infinite good both to each such blissful life, and to the world as a whole. Nagasawa 
doesn’t mention that, in addition, if God’s existence entails that every evil that occurs only 
does so because it is necessary for some greater good, then all the evils we see around us, 
including evolutionary evil, are of necessity outweighed by greater goods.45 If so, then it 
seems that a theist world would, of necessity, be not just good, but supremely or even 
infinitely good. 
 However, another thing that Nagasawa doesn’t discuss is the possibility that God’s 
existence has distinctive downsides, as anti-theists argue. Unless such downsides are ruled 
out, then the goods entailed by God’s existence cannot, on their own, decide the world’s 
overall value. For example, your eternal bliss in the afterlife might be outweighed by the 
badness of the never-ending violation of your privacy.46 If so, then under theism the world 
might not be an “overall good place”. 
 This may seem surprising. After all, Leibniz famously argued that God created the best 
of all possible worlds, and even those who reject this claim assume that God must create a 
world that’s at least good enough. Notice, however, that if we admit ‘atheist’ worlds into the 
space of possible worlds—as Nagasawa’s argument assumes—then Leibniz’s claim is 
misleading: since God cannot create such atheist worlds, the claim should really be that God 
created (or would have created) the best of all the possible worlds available to Him. But on 
either reading, Leibniz’s comparative claim entails nothing categorical about the world that 
God will create: Nozick tells the old joke about the optimist who says this is the best of all 
worlds; the pessimist agrees.47 The best might still be bad.  
 Why, however, would God create a world, if that world is not good? To begin with, 
atheists needn’t accept that, had God existed, He would have created anything. Second, God 
having good reason to create the world only requires that a world containing only God is no 
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better, or worse, than God plus the (or a) world; and the latter might still be bad (or no good), 
even if better.48 
 I concede that Theist Optimism is plausible. But this must be defended as a substantive 
value claim. It is not simply entailed by the concept of God.49 
 
Conclusion 
 Atheists typically see the theory of evolution as offering strong support to their position. 
It helps them reply to the argument from design and, because the evolutionary process 
involves a staggering amount of senseless suffering over many millions of years, it is also 
seen as greatly bolstering the argument from evil. But that mass of past suffering remains 
even within the atheist framework, and in my view Nagasawa is quite right that atheists tend 
to overlook its significance. We cannot be outraged by the idea that a benevolent god would 
allow such suffering to go on yet forget all about it the moment we’ve concluded that God 
doesn’t exist. Nagasawa sketches an intriguing challenge to atheists: the natural evil 
associated with evolution, he suggests, is incompatible with optimism about the world, and 
with the kind of gratitude about one’s existence that many atheists feel. I have argued here 
that, first, even if the evil associated with evolution is incompatible with such optimism, this 
gives us no reason to accept theism. Second, while there is at least an empirical case to be 
made that terrestrial evolutionary past was overall bad, this is not sufficient ground for 
rejecting axiological optimism in any broader sense. Third, even if we were forced to reject 
such axiological optimism, this need not have much effect on our lives, nor prevent us from 
feeling gratitude for them. However, while I have argued that Nagasawa’s argument is 
unsuccessful as it stands, I have also suggested that it offers a promising model for a 
distinctive kind of categorical axiological argument that has not yet been discussed so far in 
the ongoing debate on the axiology of (a)theism. Just as we can ask whether it would be 
better, or worse, if God exists, we can also ask whether if God exists (or does not exist) the 
world would be overall good or bad. The gruesome evolutionary past cannot decide such 
questions on its own. But it will play a large role in any serious attempt to answer them.50 
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